The article analyzes and presents the results of international experience of integration development in the field of tourism and hospitality, modern and efficient methods of integration in the field of tourism. The effective ways of realization of integration development programs at tourist enterprises and hotel chains are determined. The main objectives of integration processes in the field of tourism are also defined. The analysis of the most famous multinational tour operators and the largest hotel chains in the world in the (...) form of a table and graph is shown. The processes that take place at the expense of integration processes in the tourism business are analyzed and identified. A promising direction for further research is the economic feasibility of the feasibility of international integration in the tourism sec. (shrink)

This paper investigates Jesus’ Principles of Breaking Barriers: A Reflection on John 4:3-42 as a pivot and principle for breaking barriers from biblical perspective. Worthy of note is the fact that there existed socio-ethnic barrier between the Jews and Samaria; gender barrier imposed by Jesus’ androcentric culture and a moral barrier imposed by the Samaritan woman’s assumed behaviour. This paper using hermeneutical theory of biblical interpretation and historical insight into this Johannine text brings to the fore that, the Jewish-Samaritan barrier (...) had ethnic, religious and political undertones which made the Samaritans and Jews to see themselves as ‘enemies’; the interaction with the Samaritan woman broke barriers and set a new agenda for relationship with ‘inferior’ gender and morally low in the human society. Herein exists principles of breaking barriers set by Jesus which are worthy of emulation in the twenty-first century which is plagued by socio-ethnic, religious, gender and moral barriers. (shrink)

The article gives a definition of the technical and economic potential of the application of the deforming broaching process. Research of the consequences of introducing deforming broaching into technological processes at manufacturing enterprises is carried out on the basis of application of system resource and matrix approach. On the basis of the performed researches, a methodological basis for the economic evaluation of the results of applying deforming broaching on the pro-duction has been developed. The article has improved the well-known scientific (...) and methodological foundations for the determination of technical and economic results of the application of deforming broaching due to the complex identifica-tion of production-organizational decisions - in technical and forms of evaluation in economic spheres. The developed approach gives an opportunity to more accu-rately assess the economic effect of introducing deforming broaching on the min-ing, metallurgical and machine building industries. It can be used to assess the economic effect of introducing other process parts processing. (shrink)

This paper investigated Efik marriage rites from a gender perspective. Marriage in Africa is a union between a man and a woman (monogamy) or mainly between a man and women (polygyny), or between a woman and men (polyandry), though this is very rare. In some cases it may be serial polygyny or polyandry, i.e. the case of marrying more than one wife or husband, but always after divorce. Marriage just like other institutions in Africa has rites of passage in which (...) those who intend to enter into it must pass through. Every culture has a sense of peculiarity as to the way in which it approaches this matter. The Efik people are not an exception to this. The question that may be asked is, how gender-balanced are these rites? The Efik people claim to have gender equality, but is this reflected in her marriage rites? Rites are symbolisms of what the actual institution which those rites represent. It is in the light of this that this paper using gender theory critically looked at the Efik traditional marriage rites from gender perspective. The paper realized that, among the Efik people’s traditional marriage rites, there is gender imbalance. It proffers ways of having gender balance in Efik traditional marriage rites. Apart from adding a voice to the cry for gender equality and equity, it provides scholarship a resource material needed for Efik ethnographic study. (shrink)

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)

Se define la Biocracia -poder político fundado en el cuidado y protección de la vida- y se describe su relación con el derecho fundamental a un nuevo orden mundial (NOM), consagrado en el artículo 28 de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (DUDH, 1948) que imperativamente obliga a los Estados a hacer plenamente efectivos todos los derechos humanos (DDHH) de todas las personas - inherentes a la dignidad humana- para que logren felicidad personal, concretando en libertad y autonomía, su (...) proyecto de vida valioso, sin daños ni arbitrariedades, cumpliendo el deber estatal de respetar, proteger y garantizar los DDHH, como reto de la comunidad internacional a favor de la familia humana en la postpandemia de la COVID-19, descrita como la primera guerra “biológica” mundial. -/- Palabras clave: Biocracia, postpandemia, derechos humanos, nuevo orden mundial, proyecto de vida valioso, democracia integral. (shrink)

Entiende Christine Korsgaard que sólo una vida gobernada por principios universales responde a nuestra condición de sujetos, pues, de otro modo, quedaríamos reducidos a un amasijo de impulsos inconexos. Quiere, no obstante, alejarse de la imagen del sujeto escindido entre razón y pasión y reivindica la necesidad de unificar cada una de las partes que lo constituyen. Tal unificación deberá descansar, según Korsgaard, en el respeto a principios morales de carácter universal, si bien confía en que una vida gobernada por (...) tales principios permita atender suficientemente los proyectos y compromisos con los que el sujeto se identifica y que constituyen su identidad práctica. En este escrito, trataré de mostrar que la propuesta de Korsgaard no acaba de alejarse de la concepción dividida del sujeto. Argumentaré, en este sentido, que las asimetrías que establece entre la identidad moral y otros tipos de identidades prácticas sólo pueden entenderse desde esa concepción escindida. (shrink)

‘Substance’ (substantia, zelfstandigheid) is a key term of Spinoza’s philosophy. Like almost all of Spinoza’s philosophical vocabulary, Spinoza did not invent this term, which has a long history that can be traced back at least to Aristotle. Yet, Spinoza radicalized the traditional notion of substance and made a very powerful use of it by demonstrating – or at least attempting to demonstrate -- that there is only one, unique substance -- God (or Nature) -- and that all other things are (...) merely modes or states of God. Some of Spinoza’s readers understood these claims as committing him to the view that only God truly exists, and while this interpretation is not groundless, we will later see that this enticing and bold reading of Spinoza as an ‘acosmist’ comes at the expense of another audacious claim Spinoza advances, i.e., that God/Nature is absolutely and actually infinite. But before we reach this last conclusion, we have a long way to go. So, let me first provide an overview of our plan. In the first section of this paper we will examine Spinoza’s definitions of ‘substance’ and ‘God’ at the opening of his magnum opus, the Ethics. Following a preliminary clarification of these two terms and their relations to the other key terms defined at the beginning of the Ethics, we will briefly address the Aristotelian and Cartesian background of Spinoza’s discussion of substance. In the second section, we will study the properties of the fundamental binary relations pertaining to Spinoza’s substance: inherence, conception, and causation. The third section will be dedicated to a clarification of Spinoza’s claim that God, the unique substance, is absolutely infinite. This essential feature of Spinoza’s substance has been largely neglected in recent Anglo-American scholarship, a neglect which has brought about an unfortunate tendency to domesticate Spinoza’s metaphysics to more contemporary views. The fourth section will study the nature of Spinoza’s monism. It will discuss and criticize the interesting yet controversial views of the eminent Spinoza scholar, Martial Gueroult, about the plurality of substances in the beginning of the Ethics; address Spinoza’s claim in Letter 50 that, strictly speaking, it is improper to describe God as “one”; and, finally, evaluate Spinoza’s kind of monism against the distinction between existence and priority monism recently introduced into the contemporary philosophical literature. The fifth and final section will explain the nature, reality, and manner of existence of modes. We therefore have an ambitious plan; let’s get down to business. (shrink)

The article which is presented here includes an analysis of concept of “care” which mostly has found itself a place in history of philosophy in different forms. Even though thinkers who gave a place to this concept in their works, the main interest is about what Herder and Heidegger said. It has been tried to show how concept of “care” is understood throughout the history of philosophy. Lastly, it has been tried if there is a possible and genuine interpretation.

This chapter examines the legacy of Kuhn’s Structure for normative philosophy of science. As an argument regarding the history of 20th century philosophy of science, I contend that the main legacy of Structure was destructive: Structure shifted philosophy of science away from addressing general normative philosophical issues (e.g., the demarcation problem, empirical testability) towards more deflationary and local approaches to normative issues. This is evident in the first generation of post-Structure philosophers of science in the 1980s and 1990s, who adopted (...) a pluralist approach to HPS. As a metaphilosophical argument regarding the methods adopted in HPS, I argue that there are a plurality of legitimate philosophical methodologies for inferring normative claims from historical cases. I frame this argument as a response to Pitt’s dilemma of case studies. I reject Pitt’s dilemma for its presupposition of an unrealistic and unfruitful standard (viz., epistemic certainty) for assessing HPS arguments and its analysis of philosophical methodology at the level of individual arguments. Pitt’s dilemma is most usefully understood as identifying potential points of criticism for HPS arguments. -/- The chapter begins with an examination of Kuhn’s normative philosophy of science in Structure and his position that historical cases provide evidence for philosophical claims. Kuhn’s philosophical methodology is insufficiently articulated, and his utilization of case studies is subject to objections (viz., interpretative bias, hasty generalization) implied by Pitt’s dilemma. I subsequently examine four post-Kuhnian methodological perspectives: (1) Ian Hacking’s particularism, (2) Helen Longino’s practice-based approach, (3) Michael Friedman’s neo-Kantianism, and (4) Hasok Chang’s complementary science. These views suggest alternative methodological strategies in HPS for addressing normative issues. I conclude by articulating some outstanding methodological challenges for the pluralist tradition of HPS—associated with the Stanford and Minnesota schools of philosophy of science—that emerged in the 1980s and remains influential. (shrink)

In his groundbreaking work of 1969, Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation, Edwin Curley attacked the traditional understanding of the substance-mode relation in Spinoza, which makes modes inhere in the substance. Curley argued that such an interpretation generates insurmountable problems, as had been already claimed by Pierre Bayle in his famous entry on Spinoza. Instead of having the modes inhere in the substance Curley suggested that the modes’ dependence upon the substance should be interpreted in terms of (efficient) causation, i.e., (...) as committing Spinoza to nothing over and above the claim that the substance is the (efficient) cause of the modes. These bold and fascinating claims generated one of the most important scholarly controversies in Spinoza scholarship of the past thirty-five years. In this chapter I argue against Curley’s interpretation and attempt to reestablish the traditional understanding of Spinozistic modes as inhering in God and as predicated of God. I also criticize Curley’s philosophical motivation for suggesting this interpretation. I do believe, however, that Curley is right about the existence of an intimate connection between the substance-mode relation and causation in Spinoza. In the next chapter I will study the notion of ‘immanent cause’, which merges efficient causality and inherence. I will clarify the relation between immanent, efficient and material causation, and show where precisely Spinoza diverged from the traditional Aristotelian taxonomy of causes. In the second chapter I also discuss the German Idealists’ view of Spinoza as an ‘acosmist’. Under this interpretation Spinoza was a modern reviver of Eleatic monism, who allegedly asserts the mere existence of God, and denies the reality of the world of particular things. Spinozistic modes - according to this reading - are nothing but passing and unreal phenomena. Though this view of Spinoza as an ‘acosmist’ can be supported by some lines in Spinoza’s thought, I believe it should be rejected since it is not consistent with some of the most central doctrines of the Ethics. In the final part of the second chapter I discuss the relation between modes and the attributes under which they fall, and suggest a terminological distinction between a ‘mode of God’ (i.e., a mode under all attributes) and a ‘mode of an attribute’ (i.e., a mode under a specific attribute), a distinction which can help us avoid some common confusions in the treatment of the issue. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to clarify the nature of the shift in Feyerabend’s philosophical thinking in the 1970s, focusing on issues of realism, relativism, and pluralism. Contra-Preston, I argue that realism-relativism is a misleading variable for characterizing Feyerabend’s shift in the 1970s. Rather, I characterize this shift as Feyerabend’s expansion of pluralism and suggest that this shift appears in Feyerabend’s publications starting in the late-1960s (e.g., Feyerabend 1968b, 1969b, 1970a, 1970c). Adopting the terminology of Brown and Kidd (2016), (...) this shift is characterized by a move from arguments for pluralism within science to broader arguments for pluralism in society. I argue that this shift was largely due to: (1) Feyerabend’s rejection of an empiricist demarcation criterion for science in the mid-1960s, and (2) Feyerabend’s incorporation of Mill’s arguments for pluralism into his own publications starting in 1970. This shift can be characterized as a broadening or expanding the scope of Feyerabend’s arguments for pluralism from contexts of scientific knowledge to the broader context of social or cultural (including ethical) knowledge. I articulate this argument with reference to the framework for classifying Feyerabend’s works formulated by Brown and Kidd (2016). Against Brown and Kidd (and Preston), I argue that realism-relativism is a red-herring as a variable for distinguishing Feyerabend’s early and middle works. Brown and Kidd’s distinction between pluralism within science and pluralism in society is a more useful variable for characterizing Feyerabend’s shift in thinking in the 1970s. Whereas Preston (1997) and Brown and Kidd (2016) identify the beginning of Feyerabend’s pluralism in society phase in 1978 with the publication of Science in a Free Society (Feyerabend 1978), I suggest that the relevant shift occurs much earlier, and it appears in Feyerabend’s publications starting in 1970 (Feyerabend 1970a, 1970b). On this understanding, Feyerabend’s philosophical shift (c. 1970) should be viewed as an expansion (or broadening) of the scope of application of his pluralist arguments, inspired by Mill’s ethical arguments for pluralism in society (Mill 1859/1977). (shrink)

El objeto de este escrito es el de responder a las críticas que Juliana da Silveira Pinheiro hiciera a mi libro (Pavesi, 2008) en la reseña publicada por Kriterion en junio del año pasado (Pinheiro, 2011). Ensayaremos pues una defensa de nuestra tesis sin renunciar, sin embargo, a otra aspiración más amplia: la de abrir un campo de discusión sobre un texto, Las Pasiones del Alma y un problema muy vigente en los estudios cartesianos actuales, este es: el que se (...) refiere al valor explicativo del cuerpo como causa segunda de las pasiones. (shrink)

La representación científica del mundo se construye sobre un tejido de teorías en las cuales hay enunciados generales que representan leyes naturales. Estas leyes son patrones de sucesos regulares. Un presupuesto básico de la ciencia es que todo acontecimiento es legal: ocurre regido por leyes que son fijas. ¿Es compatible esa legalidad con la libertad de elección que creemos tener? ¿Cuáles son las implicaciones para la libertad política que debemos esperar en una sociedad organizada y racional? ¿Cuál es el rol (...) de la ética en todo esto? Trataré de responder a estas preguntas aquí, defendiendo la concepción de una sociedad abierta, democrática y plural, que maximice la libertad de elección y acción de las personas que la forman. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify Spinoza’s views on some of the most fundamental issues of his metaphysics: the nature of God’s attributes, the nature of existence and eternity, and the relation between essence and existence in God. While there is an extensive literature on each of these topics, it seems that the following question was hardly raised so far: What is, for Spinoza, the relation between God’s existence and the divine attributes? Given Spinoza’s claims that there are (...) intimate connections between God’s essence and his existence – “God’s essence and his existence are one and the same”(E1p20) – and between God’s essence and the attributes – “By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting its essence” (E1d4), we would naturally expect that by transitivity, there is a significant relation between God’s existence and the attributes. Yet, as far as I know, there is little, if any, attempt in the existing literature to explicate such a relation, and it is one of my aims of this study to both raise the question and answer it. Eventually, I will argue that for Spinoza God is nothing but existence, and that the divine attributes are just fundamental kinds of existence, or, what is the same, as I will later argue, the intellect’s most fundamental and adequate conceptions of existence. In the first part of the paper I provide some background for Spinoza’s brief discussion in the TTP of God’s name and essence by studying the claims of Maimonides in the Guide of the Perplexed that God’s true essence is necessary existence, and that this essence is denoted by the ineffable Hebrew name of God, the Tetragrammaton (YHVH). In the second part of the paper I point out similar claims Spinoza presents in the TTP, and show how they respond to and echo Maimonides’ discussion in the Guide. In the third part, I examine Spinoza’s apparently conflicting claims in the Ethics about the relationship between God’s essence and existence. In some places Spinoza claims that God’s essence and existence are strictly identical (E1p10: “God’s essence his existence are one and the same”), but in other passages he makes the apparently much more modest claim that God’s essence involves existence (E1d1, E1p7d and E1p11d), which may lead one to believe that there is more to God’s essence than mere existence. I show that Spinoza’s understanding of the relation denoted by the Latin ‘involvit’ is consistent with the strict identification of essence and existence in God, and that Spinoza identifies God’s essence with self-necessitated existence, or eternity. Indeed, Spinoza’s understanding of eternity [aeternitas] as self-necessitated existence (E1d8) is one of the very few Spinozistic concepts that has no trace in Descartes. In this part I will also solve the long-standing problem of the sense in which the infinite modes can be called ‘eternal.’ In the fourth part I turn to the relation between the divine attributes and God’s existence and argue that, for Spinoza, the attributes are self-sufficient and adequate conceptions of existence. Finally, I will attempt to explain what brought Spinoza to deify existence. -/- Part I: “In that Day shall God be One, and his Name One”- Maimonides on God’s Name and Essence. -/- 1.1 Before we delve into the texts, let me suggest a few distinctions between various views on the issue of the relation between essence and existence in God. The view I suspect both Maimonides and Spinoza subscribe to can be termed the divine essence-existence Identity Thesis. -/- Identity Thesis (IT): God’s essence is existence and nothing but existence. We should distinguish the Identity Thesis from the much more common view according to which God’s essence contains existence, or (which I take to be roughly the same) that existence is one of the properties or perfections which constitute God’s essence. The latter view allows for the possibility (though it does not demand) that there is more to God’s essence than bare existence (e.g., God’s essence may include omniscience, omnipotence, etc.). I will term this view the divine essence-existence Containment Thesis. (shrink)

Se analiza la relación de la dignidad humana con el derecho fundamental a la democracia y la configuración del constitucionalismo humanista, vigente desde la segunda postguerra mundial, como pilares de la procura del desarrollo humano integral (DHI) a partir de la premisa contenida en el derecho convencional internacional y el derecho interno de los países de Occidente sobre derechos humanos: todas las personas somos iguales en dignidad y derechos. Se describe la dignidad humana desde la perspectiva dogmático-jurídica, acuñada por la (...) Corte Constitucional colombiana, en tanto categoría fundante de los derechos fundamentales, entendida i) como un derecho autónomo relacionado con la elección y realización del proyecto de vida valioso de la persona; ii) como condiciones materiales concretas para una existencia decente y iii) como expresión de la inviolabilidad de la persona en su integridad física e integridad moral para que vivan una vida con sentido miedo, sin torturas y sin humillaciones. Se explican las razones para concebir la democracia integral descrita como un derecho humano fundamental, es decir, un supra-derecho, que deviene en condición de posibilidad para la efectiva realización de los demás derechos humanos fundamentales de la persona basado en la relevancia de la dignidad humana en el contexto del llamado Constitucionalismo Humanista que da contenido jurídico y axiológico i) al Convencionalismo Humanista Supranacional, es decir, al Bloque de Constitucionalidad que integran los pactos, tratados y convenciones internacionales sobre derechos humanos con rango ius cogens, vinculantes, imperativos, obligatorios y ii) a las Constituciones internas de la mayoría de los países de Occidente que reconocen y desarrollan aquellos bajo el paraguas del Estado democrático constitucional. (shrink)

Marta Suria writes *Ella soy yo* as part of her response to the irruption of the memories of the sexual aggressions she had suffered since childhood. She is convinced that the way she narrates her experience will transform and liberate her. How is it at all possible that a certain kind of narrative may transform and li- berate us? In this paper, we will first describe the conception of the relationship between language and experience that lies behind this perplexity and, (...) secondly, we will sketch an alternative conception that will hopefully allow us to account for the transformative power of certain kinds of narratives. This alternative conception will hinge on the idea of expression and on the concept of aspect perception. For this purpose, we will firstly argue that language can be used not only to describe or evaluate our experience, but also to express it; we will, then, defend the view that linguistic or gestural expressions of our experiences not only announce or manifest them, but contribute to shaping and modulating them; finally, we will highlight the transformative, humanizing power of certain expressive uses of language. (shrink)

In psychiatry, pharmacological research has played a crucial role in the formulation, revision, and refinement of neurobiological theories of psychopathology. Besides being utilized as potential treatments for various mental disorders, pharmacological drugs play an important epistemic role as experimental instruments that help scientists uncover the neurobiological underpinnings of mental disorders (Tsou, 2012). Interventions with psychiatric patients using pharmacological drugs provide researchers with information about the neurobiological causes of mental disorders that cannot be obtained in other ways. This important source of (...) evidence for the biological causes of mental disorder is often overlooked in philosophical analyses of psychiatry, especially in skeptical analyses that debase the biological aspects of psychopathology (e.g., Szasz, 1960; Scheff, 1963; Laing, 1967). In discussing pharmacological interventions as a form of evidence for the physical basis of mental disorders, this paper aims to clarify the nature, reliability, and limitations of this evidence. In addition, it illustrates the central role that pharmacological findings in applied clinical contexts play in the acquisition of neurobiological knowledge in research contexts. (shrink)

Ligado directamente a la dinámica de los movimientos renovadores del arte que surgieron en la España de los años veinte, el texto de Ortega y Gasset ofrece unas perspectivas más amplias y entronca con la renovación de la estética y la historia del arte que había iniciado la tradición teórica e historiográfica alemana a finales del siglo XIX. Ofrecemos, además otros escritos que, como «¿Una exposición Zuloaga?», «La Gioconda», «Diálogo sobre el arte nuevo», «Ensayo de estética a manera de prólogo» (...) y «Sobre la crítica del arte», permiten una mejor comprensión del pensamiento de Ortega y del debate artístico y estético en España. La presente edición va precedida de un prólogo de Valeriano Bozal. (shrink)

This paper addresses philosophical issues concerning whether mental disorders are natural kinds and how the DSM should classify mental disorders. I argue that some mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, depression) are natural kinds in the sense that they are natural classes constituted by a set of stable biological mechanisms. I subsequently argue that a theoretical and causal approach to classification would provide a superior method for classifying natural kinds than the purely descriptive approach adopted by the DSM since DSM-III. My argument (...) suggests that the DSM should classify natural kinds in order to provide predictively useful (i.e., projectable) diagnostic categories and that a causal approach to classification would provide a more promising method for formulating valid diagnostic categories. (shrink)

En esta nota ofrezco una caracterización de los conceptos de experiencia estética, valor estético y belleza.

In this article, I argue that depression and suicide are natural kinds insofar as they are classes of abnormal behavior underwritten by sets of stable biological mechanisms. In particular, depression and suicide are neurobiological kinds characterized by disturbances in serotonin functioning that affect various brain areas (i.e., the amygdala, anterior cingulate, prefrontal cortex, and hippocampus). The significance of this argument is that the natural (biological) basis of depression and suicide allows for reliable projectable inferences (i.e., predictions) to be made about (...) individual members of a kind. In the context of assisted suicide, inferences about the decision-making capacity of depressed individuals seeking physician-assisted suicide are of special interest. I examine evidence that depression can hamper the decision-making capacity of individuals seeking assisted suicide and discuss some implications. (shrink)

According to David Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness consists of explaining how and why qualitative experience arises from physical states. Moreover, Chalmers argues that materialist and reductive explanations of mentality are incapable of addressing the hard problem. In this chapter, I suggest that Chalmers’ hard problem can be usefully distinguished into a ‘how question’ and ‘why question,’ and I argue that evolutionary biology has the resources to address the question of why qualitative experience arises from brain states. From this (...) perspective, I discuss the different kinds of evolutionary explanations (e.g., adaptationist, exaptationist, spandrel) that can explain the origins of the qualitative aspects of various conscious states. This argument is intended to clarify which parts of Chalmers’ hard problem are amenable to scientific analysis. (shrink)

Se presenta un breve análisis comparativo del lenguaje religioso y el lenguaje científico.

A minimal essentialism (‘intrinsic biological essentialism’) about natural kinds is required to explain the projectability of human science terms. Human classifications that yield robust and ampliative projectable inferences refer to biological kinds. I articulate this argument with reference to an intrinsic essentialist account of HPC kinds. This account implies that human sciences (e.g., medicine, psychiatry) that aim to formulate predictive kind categories should classify biological kinds. Issues concerning psychiatric classification and pluralism are examined.

I discuss whether "sentience" (i.e., phenomenal consciousness) comes in degrees.

This chapter examines the influence of the empirical sciences (e.g., physics, biology, psychology) in contemporary analytic philosophy, with focus on philosophical theories that are guided by findings from the empirical sciences. Scientific approaches to philosophy follow a tradition of philosophical naturalism associated with Quine, which strives to ally philosophical methods and theories more closely with the empirical sciences and away from a priori theorizing and conceptual analysis.

Se responde, desde la dogmática de la Corte Constitucional colombiana, aduciendo los “criterios de identificación” normativa de los derechos fundamentales centrados en i) su relación de funcionalidad con el logro del contenido normativo de la dignidad humana, ii) su traducción como derechos subjetivos, iii) los “consensos dogmáticos, jurisprudenciales o de derecho internacional, legal y reglamentario sobre su fundamentalidad” y, iv) su exigibilidad -más que su propia justiciabilidad-, como presupuestos jurídicos, reconocimiento y aplicación pragmática constitucional en la esfera de vida de (...) la persona humana y la comunidad política, basados, también, en los pilares conceptuales del llamado Constitucionalismo Humanista. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente artículo tiene por finalidad describir y analizar las actitudes y los valores hacia la educación, el trabajo y el consumo, así como las representaciones del tiempo, de tres generaciones de jóvenes españoles durante las etapas del capitalismo de producción y el de consumo. Durante este periodo los jóvenes de estas generaciones cambiaron su orientación hacia estos ámbitos, cambiando también sus identidades. En la primera parte del artículo se mostrará el contexto social general en el que se producen (...) dichos cambios, mientras que la segunda parte estará dedicada enteramente a la descripción y al análisis de las generaciones que son el objeto principal de este estudio. -/- Abstract: This article aims to describe and analyze the attitudes and values towards education, work and consumption, as well as representations of time, three generations of young Spaniards during the stages of capitalist production and consumption. During this period the young people of these generations change their orientation to these areas, also changing their identities. In the first part of the article will be shown the general social context in which these changes will be displayed. While the second part will be devoted entirely to the description and analysis of the generations that are the main object of this study. (shrink)

Recently, some philosophers of science (e.g., Gürol Irzik, Michael Friedman) have challenged the ‘received view’ on the relationship between Rudolf Carnap and Thomas Kuhn, suggesting that there is a close affinity (rather than opposition) between their philosophical views. In support of this argument, these authors cite Carnap and Kuhn’s similar views on incommensurability, theory-choice, and scientific revolutions. Against this revisionist view, I argue that the philosophical relationship between Carnap and Kuhn should be regarded as opposed rather than complementary. In particular, (...) I argue that a consideration of the fundamentally disparate nature of the broader philosophical projects of Carnap (logic of science) and Kuhn (providing a theory of scientific revolutions)renders the alleged similarities between their views superficial in comparison to their fundamental differences. In defense of the received view, I suggest that Carnap and Kuhn are model representatives of two contrasting styles of doing philosophy of science, viz., logical analysis and historical analysis respectively. This analysis clarifies the role played by Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the demise of logical empiricism in the second half of the twentieth-century. (shrink)

Consequentialist views have traditionally taken a maximizing form, requiring agents to bring about the very best outcome that they can. But this maximizing function may be questioned. Satisficing views instead allow agents to bring about any outcome that exceeds a satisfactory threshold or qualifies as “good enough.” Scalar consequentialism, by contrast, eschews moral requirements altogether, instead evaluating acts in purely comparative terms, i.e., as better or worse than their alternatives. After surveying the main considerations for and against each of these (...) three views, I argue that the core insights of each are not (despite appearances) in conflict. Consequentialists should be deontic pluralists and accept a maximizing account of the ought of most reason, a satisficing account of obligation, and a scalar account of the weight of reasons. (shrink)

The early modern period was the natural historical habitat of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, i.e., the demand that everything must have a cause, or reason. It is in this period that the principle was explicitly articulated and named, and throughout the period we find numerous formulations and variants of the PSR and its closely related ‘ex nihilo nihil fit’ principle, which the early moderns inherited from medieval philosophy. Contemporary discussions of these principles were not restricted to philosophy. “Nothing will (...) come of nothing; speak again” old King Lear tells his daughter Cordelia at the beginning of Shakespeare’s celebrated tragedy, and in early modern science, conservation principles were the order of the day. Within philosophy, Malebranche stipulates that there cannot be an effect without a cause, and Berkeley motivates his idealism by an appeal to ‘ex nihilo nihil fit.’ Were we to try to provide an exhaustive survey the various formulations of the PSR in this period – including the weaker ones – we would be writing an encyclopedia. In fact, one wonders whether any early modern thinker was willing to accept a wholesale rejection of the PSR, i.e., a view which states that no fact requires an explanation. Moreover, the view that many – perhaps most – facts require an explanation seems to be tacitly assumed even by us today, in both our theoretical and colloquial discourse. For these reasons, this chapter will focus on two early modern philosophers who advocated very strong (i.e., virtually exceptionless) versions of the PSR: Benedict de Spinoza and G.W. Leibniz. Following a brief overview of Descartes’s restricted endorsement of the PSR, I will turn to discuss the central features of the PSR in the writings of Spinoza (§2) and those of Leibniz (§3). In the cases of each of these philosophers, we will examine carefully: (i) their main statements of the PSR, (ii) the scope they assign to the principle (i.e., what requires an explanation and what counts as an explanation), (iii) the modal strength they assign to the principle, (iv) the main implications they draw from the principle, (v) exceptions to the principle, and, finally, (vi) the justification of the principle. In §4, we will study a principle, complementing the PSR, namely, the assertion that everything and every fact must have an effect (or as Leibniz would put it: “nothing is sterile”). (shrink)

The distinction between essence (essentia) and existence (existentia) plays a major role in Spinoza’s metaphysics. Although the distinction did not originate with Avicenna, it is primarily through Avicenna’s influence that it became widespread, if not ubiquitous, in both Jewish and Christian medieval philosophy (e.g., Ogden 2021). Spinoza was clearly familiar with this important distinction through his study of Maimonides, Crescas, and Descartes, and it is particularly useful to examine Spinoza’s employment of the distinction in contrast to Descartes’. In the Meditations, (...) Descartes relies on the distinction in a proof of God’s existence, and in his exploration of the essence of material things (both in Meditation Five). (shrink)

In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel offers the following verdict on Spinoza’s ontology: “According to Spinoza what is, is God, and God alone. Therefore, the allegations of those who accuse Spinoza of atheism are the direct opposite of the truth; with him there is too much God” (Hegel 1995, vol. 3, 281-2). It is not easy to dismiss Hegel’s grand pronouncement, since Spinoza indeed clearly affirms: “whatever is, is in God” (E1p15). Crocodiles, porcupines (and your thoughts about (...) crocodiles and porcupines) are all in God. There is nothing that is not in Spinoza’s God. Spinoza defines God at the very opening page of the Ethics, and the definition (and its explication) unfold in three successively elucidatory steps: First, Spinoza characterizes God as “a being absolutely infinite [ens absolute infinitum]. Then, he spells out this characterization: “i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence” (E1def6). Finally, Spinoza adds an explicatio to the entire definition: “I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its own kind; for if something is only infinite in its own kind, we can deny infinite attributes of it; but if something is absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its essence.” Throughout his philosophical career Spinoza plays with the precise formulation of this definition; its core remains pretty stable, though the small variations might indicate attempts to explore alternative nuances (see, for example, KV II.1; I/19; Ep. 2; IV/7; Ep. 83; IV/335). (shrink)

Using William Shakespeare’s Hamlet and the play-within-the play, The Murder of Gonzago, as a case study, this essay argues that theatrical utterances constitute a special case of language usage not previously elucidated: the utterance of a statement with propositional content in theatre functions as an event. In short, the propositional content of a particular p (e.g. p1, p2, p3 …), whether or not it is true, is only understood—and understood to be true—if p1 is uttered in a particular time, place, (...) and situation (i.e. during a theatrical event); otherwise, the propositional content in those theatrical utterances can either be false or contingently true. (shrink)

Relatar lo ocurrido como invención: una introducción a la filosofía de la ficción contemporánea ofrece al lector en castellano una magnífica oportunidad para familiarizarse con algunos aspectos centrales de la filosofía del lenguaje contemporánea y sus implicaciones para la teoría de la ficción. García-Carpintero recorre los argumentos fundamentales en favor y en contra de cada una de las posiciones relevantes, y nos propone finalmente un análisis alternativo de la norma de la ficción y una teoría neofregeana de los términos referenciales (...) que logra esquivar algunas objeciones tradicionales. Esta discusión incluye, no obstante, dos objeciones a su norma de la ficción: una se refiere a las formas de la conciencia que esa norma presupone y la otra a la naturaleza del interés que suscitan los proyectos imaginativos vinculados a las obras de ficción. (shrink)

Nếu nền kinh tế quốc gia là một cơ thể sống, thì hệ thống tài chính là cơ chế tạo, cung cấp và lưu thông máu tới từng tế bào, bộ phận. Thiếu hay thừa đều phát sinh các vấn đề cần giải quyết. Với quá trình chuyển đổi kinh tế và hội nhập quốc tế mạnh mẽ, liên tục giám sát, kịp thời dự đoán sát thực các dấu hiệu và biến động của thị trường để từ đó xây (...) dựng chính sách điều tiết thị trường tài chính và toàn bộ nền kinh tế một cách hợp lý là việc làm cần thiết bảo đảm tăng trưởng kinh tế bền vững, đúng định hướng. Đối với nền tài chính của Việt Nam, hiện đang tồn tại bảy dấu hiệu cảnh báo cần được các nhà nghiên cứu và hoạch định chính sách quan tâm. (shrink)

En este artículo se presenta una caracterización del concepto de falacia, con énfasis en la llamada ‘falacia de apelación a lo natural’. Se explica el alcance de esta falacia, y su peligrosidad, en particular en el ámbito de las ciencias de la salud y de alimentos.

Modern webpages consist of many rich objects dynamically produced by servers and client terminals at diverse locations, so we face an increase in web response time. To reduce the time, edge computing, in which dynamic objects are generated and delivered from edge nodes, is effective. For ISPs and CDN providers, it is desirable to estimate the effect of reducing the web response time when introducing edge computing. Therefore, in this paper, we derive a simple formula that estimates the lower bound (...) of the reduction of the response time by modeling flows obtaining objects of webpages. We investigate the effect of edge computing in each webpage category, e.g., News and Sports, using data measured by browsing about 1,000 popular webpages from 12 locations in the world on PlanetLab. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene por objeto analizar la noción de ciencia jurídica de los profesores Carlos E. Alchourrón y Eugenio Bulygin. Ésta parte del presupuesto de que la ciencia jurídica no está autorizada a crear nuevo Derecho, sino que sólo puede aspirar legítimamente a representarlo de alguna manera. Eso no significa que la suya sea una actividad meramente especulativa, en el sentido etimológico del término. Esto es, la ciencia jurídica no se limita a reflejar, como en un espejo, el Derecho tal (...) y como se nos presenta empíricamente, sino que confiere a éste un importante valor añadido a través de su sistematización. La primera parte de este trabajo está dedicada a exponer el modelo científico propuesto por los mencionados autores. En la segunda parte se presta especial atención a la cuestión de la separación entre descripción y prescripción en la actividad de la ciencia jurídica. Por último, en la tercera parte se cuestiona la utilidad del modelo propuesto sobre la base de los postulados teóricos de que se le hace partir, a lo que se suman ciertas dificultades metodológicas. (shrink)

Vào ngày 19/4/2024 vừa qua, Tuyên bố New York về Ý thức của Động vật đã được công bố tại một hội nghị "Khoa học Mới nổi về Ý thức của Động vật" được tổ chức tại Đại học New York. Tuyên bố New York là một nỗ lực để thể hiện sự đồng thuận của giới khoa học về sự tồn tại trải nghiệm ý thức ở tất cả các loài có xương sống (bao gồm tất cả các loài (...) bò sát, lưỡng cư và cá) và nhiều loài không xương sống (bao gồm, ít nhất là, các loài mực ống, giáp xác mười chân và côn trùng). Về mặt khoa học, Tuyên bố New York là một bước tiến bộ lớn cho nhân loại, nhưng nó cũng sẽ khiến cho nhiều người có ý thức hơn về các thách thức đạo đức liên quan đến động vật có trải nghiệm ý thức. Bài viết này sẽ bàn về các cách tiếp cận triết học đối với vấn đề đạo đức của việc giết các sinh vật có tri giác để từ đó chỉ ra nan đề đạo đức đang hiện hữu trong xã hội loài người: Để duy trì sự tồn tại của con người, loài được xem là có đạo đức, thì chúng ta lại vi phạm đạo đức của chính chúng ta, là sát sinh các loài có giá trị nội tại, ý thức, hay tri giác khác. Nan đề đạo đức này đã tồn tại trong xã hội loài người từ rất lâu trước đây. Nhiều giải pháp đã được đề xuất và ứng dụng vào thực tế nhầm giải quyết nan đề này, như cách tiếp cận bất bạo lực và ăn chay của Phật giáo, việc áp dụng luật Hồi giáo và các nghi lễ thiêng liêng đối với động vật trong Hồi giáo, các phòng trào đòi quyền cho động vật và thực hiện tuyệt chủng tự nguyện ở các nước phương Tây, hay chế biến thịt sử dụng tế bào động vật. Tuy nhiên, dù cách nào đi nữa thì hiện nay chúng ta vẫn chưa thể hoàn toàn giải quyết được nan đề đạo đức, đó là các sinh vật có tri giác vẫn tiếp tục bị giết vì sự sinh tồn của con người. Chúng tôi cho rằng giải pháp khả thi nhất hiện nay đó là thay đổi văn hóa tiêu dùng thực phẩm ở hiện tại, xây dựng các giá trị văn hóa thặng dư sinh thái, và thúc đẩy các giải pháp hòa bình. (shrink)

● Un emplazamiento cualquiera (v. gr. sol en Tauro; Marte en Capricornio; Mercurio en la tercera casa) es necesariamente común a decenas de miles de personas. Saturno hospedado en la novena casa, por ejemplo, no se comportará de la misma manera o no producirá los mismos efectos en las veinte o cien cartas en que allí lo encontremos, sino en concordancia con el resto de la composición astrográfica (como hospedarnos en el mismo hotel en diferentes épocas o diferentes personas haber (...) contraído la misma enfermedad; nuestra estadía será diferente cada vez, según la época, y no todos los enfermos presentarán los mismos síntomas, según su metabolismo; por no mencionar que cada astrografía, como cada código o secuencia genética, es irrepetible). Ciertamente, “ningún planeta puede, por sí solo, producir lo que solamente la acción mancomunada o conjunta de todos puede” (BUSTAMANTE, 2023, revista SPICA, págs. 93-111). He aquí la naturaleza o condición sinérgica del ejercicio interpretativo (i.e., el todo es poco más que la suma de todas sus partes). ● El componente fundamental de la expresión matemática del ejercicio interpretativo lo constituye la triangulación astrológica, denominación funcional de lo que conocemos como síntesis (WEISS, 1946; LEO, 1983; HAND, 1981). ● Con el fin de demostrar su utilidad, así como la conveniencia de su expresión matemática, hemos escogido dos individuos (JEFFREY DAHMER, STEVEN SPIELBERG) cuyas astrografías no explican, según la comunidad, sus vidas. El resto de las astrografías corresponden a las de los asesinos en serie JOHN WAYNE GACY, DAVID CARPENTER y TED BUNDY. ● A través de notaciones algebraicas, explicamos la síntesis y los valores funcionales que la componen. ● Tomamos la luna y Neptuno como planetas relevantes a propósito del diagnóstico o el estudio de asuntos endocrinos o neurohormonales y a Marte, Plutón y Saturno como planetas relevantes a los fines de inferir violencia o comportamiento siniestro, según el caso, y las cuadraturas u oposiciones —y conjunciones— entre Venus y la luna, la luna y Neptuno o entre el sol o Venus y Neptuno o Urano como indicadores de desórdenes neurohormonales y/o de desviación sexual (definición APA) . ● Consideramos las cuadraturas u oposiciones —y conjunciones— entre: Mercurio o la luna y Saturno, o entre Marte o la luna y Saturno, Urano, Neptuno y/o Plutón como poderosos indicios de violencia o de desequilibrio, según el caso. ● También hemos considerado a Sagitario como un signo tan expansivo y abundante como su regente, Júpiter, según la mejor de sus caracterizaciones (o excepcionalmente raudo y salvaje, según otras), y a la quinta región de un mapa natal como una estrechamente relacionada con la fortuna en sentido amplio (material e inmaterial). ● Debido a que defendemos la idea según la cual los orbes deben predicarse del planeta (tamaño, velocidad), no del aspecto, a los gigantes gaseosos (Júpiter, Saturno, Urano y Neptuno) y al sol les hemos concedido hasta 10º de orbe (o 12º, en el caso de la influencia amplia ). ● Entendemos las relaciones aspectuales como relaciones angulares sostenidas entre dos o más cuerpos celestes emplazados en signos con al menos una propiedad en común (según nuestra teoría molecular de la eclíptica, compatible con la teoría óptica de los aspectos de la tradición helenística). (shrink)

Ofrezco una justificación breve del valor de la actividad científica y una vindicación de su defensa.

Like most, if not all, of his contemporaries, Spinoza never developed a full-fledged philosophy of mathematics. Still, his numerous remarks about mathematics attest not only to his deep interest in the subject (a point which is also confirmed by the significant presence of mathematical books in his library), but also to his quite elaborate and perhaps unique understanding of the nature of mathematics. At the very center of his thought about mathematics stands a paradox (or, at least, an apparent paradox): (...) mathematics provides Spinoza with an epistemic model. Mathematical knowledge is certain (II/138/9 and II/138/9), clear (IV/261/8), and free from teleological thinking (II/79/33), but the objects of mathematical knowledge – i.e., mathematical entities – are nothing but “auxila imaginationis [aids of the imagination],” (IV/57/16 and II/83/15), entities that are not real and merely assist the imagination in carving the world in manner that is suitable to our limited and distortive cognitive capacities. (shrink)

Los análisis y propuestas sobre la vida y el futuro de los países, que es siempre la vida y el futuro de seres humanos concretos —personas, ciudadanos—, no pueden, principalmente en situaciones de crisis y dificultades graves, ser abordados desde teorías en abstracto o desde orientaciones ideológicas cerradas. Esto último implicaría una renuncia a considerar que el centro de la vida de las sociedades son las personas como sujetos no sólo de derechos y deberes sino principalmente sujetos capaces de decidir, (...) de elegir, entendida esta capacidad como lo que caracteriza a los seres humanos. El pensamiento personalista, principalmente en su orientación cristiana, señala un camino para la búsqueda de nuevas formas de la economía y la política, como mediaciones imprescindibles para la realización de la vida humana, de su poder transformador –entendido como capacidad— y de la superación de visiones centradas en el poder—entendido como dominio—, de macrosujetos como los Estados que se alejan de los ciudadanos o los mercados que manipulan a los consumidores. (shrink)

En *Racionalidad, acción y opacidad*, Fernando Broncano nos invita a poner en cuestión una ima- gen de la racionalidad y de la agencia que se sitúa en el centro de la cultura filosófica contemporánea. Es una imagen que nace con la modernidad y ocupa un lugar tan nuclear en nuestra cultura que se sostiene más allá de cualquier evidencia que podamos aportar en su contra. La tarea que emprende *Racionalidad, acción y opacidad* es subrayar los puntos ciegos de esa imagen, (...) cómo nos aleja de nuestras prácticas y experiencias, su incapacidad para dar cuenta de las mismas; o, dicho de otro modo, las dificultades de esa imagen para atender a las exigencias del equilibrio reflexivo que toda propuesta filosófica debe satisfacer. En este comentario, se elucidan varios aspectos de esa imagen y discute el análisis que de ellos propone Broncano. (shrink)